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AbstRAct
This paper describes one example of  how ordinary national rules can 
provide essential compliance regulation to assess human rights abuses. It 
argues that sometimes purely competitiveness, commercial or even domestic 
common-law doctrine between private, non-state actors can be in fact hu-
man rights claims even if  never pleaded as such internationally or in courts. 
The example studied is the new consumptive demand clause by the Trade 
Enforcement and Trade Facilitation Act of  2015 a ground-breaking change 
in a national American law that impacts the whole world. Because of  that 
all importers to America need to be able to prove that do not use forced 
labor in their supply chains, so they are compelled to have a chain of  cus-
tody to backtrack the production up to the raw material. In response to this 
new scenario, new challenges arise like the uneven distribution of  complian-
ce costs between different capabilities companies from different locations. 
This Article sustain that legal studies have lot to gain from expanding the 
scope of  human rights analyses to business practices but alert about the 
possibility of  misinformation. The methodology chosen was the descriptive 
and normative, using case study techniques and documentary, legislative and 
bibliographic research.
Keywords: Human Rights Governance. Sustainable Development Goals. 
Global Value Chains. Market Access. Trade. Forced Labor.
Resumo
Este artigo descreve como leis nacionais internas podem ser regulamen-
tação para o cumprimento e verificação de abusos de direitos humanos in-
ternacionalmente. A doutrina concorrencial, comercial, administrativa ou 
mesmo processual entre atores privados, não estatais, podem, de fato, conter 
reivindicações de direitos humanos, mesmo que nunca sejam assim aberta-
mente anunciadas internacionalmente ou em tribunais. O exemplo estudado 
é a cláusula de demanda de consumo da lei estadunidense de execução co-
mercial e facilitação de comércio de 2015, uma mudança inovadora em uma 
lei nacional americana que afeta o mundo inteiro. Por causa dela, todos os 
importadores para os EUA precisam provar que não usam trabalho forçado 
em suas cadeias de suprimentos, então são obrigados a ter uma cadeia de 
custódia para auditar a produção até a matéria-prima. Em resposta a este 
novo cenário, novos desafios surgem como a distribuição desigual de custos 
de conformidade entre diferentes empresas de diferentes locais e com ca-
pacidades diversas. Este artigo sustenta que os estudos jurídicos têm muito 
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a ganhar com a expansão do escopo das análises de di-
reitos humanos para as práticas de negócios, mas alerta 
sobre a possibilidade de desinformação. A metodologia 
escolhida foi a descritiva e normativa, utilizando técni-
cas de estudo de caso e pesquisa documental, legislativa 
e bibliográfica.
Palavras-chave: Governança de Direitos Humanos. 
Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável. Cadeias 
Globais de Valor. Acesso a Mercados. Comércio. Tra-
balho Forçado.
1. IntRoductIon 
“High performance with high integrity”1 is the key 
to global business success nowadays. Besides being 
morally wrong, human rights neglecting can cost ma-
rket access in the current governance system oriented 
by corporate social environmental governance, which 
measures ethics broadly through governmental, priva-
te, national, foreign, mandatory or voluntary strategies. 
In this scenario consumer boycotts, reputational losses 
and responsibility for noncompliance with expected 
conduct are not the only risks to be assessed. 
In terms of  competition, for example, more and 
more companies suffer with the lack of  fair play, there-
fore themselves demand for stringent regulations. Most 
of  global players are American and European corpo-
rations but their national regulation and private nor-
ms tend to impact the market as a whole regardless of  
international borders. An example is the consumptive 
demand clause by the Trade Enforcement and Trade 
Facilitation Act of  2015 2 a ground-breaking change in 
a national American law that impacts the whole world. 
Because of  this rule all importers to America need 
to be able to prove that do not use forced labor in their 
supply chains, so they are compelled to have a chain of  
custody to backtrack the production up to the raw ma-
terial. International organizations and civil society have 
an important role to play in this system of  governance 
because in today’s global-value-chain economy, profita-
1 BAUMANN-PAULY, Dorothée; NOLAN, Justine. Business and 
human rights: from principles to practice. Abingdon: Oxon; New 
York: Routledge, 2016. p. 88.
2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Trade Enforcement and 
Trade Facilitation Act of  2015. Disponível em: <https://www.con-
gress.gov/114/plaws/publ125/PLAW-114publ125.pdf>.
bility increases the more and better integrated are the 
various capillary production points around the world. 
However, if  this global logistic, on one hand provi-
des gains of  specialization, economy of  scale and ex-
ploitation of  local comparative advantages, on the other 
hand it presents the challenge of  compliance with global 
ethical standards. To sell products and services to high 
standards markets such as the European and American, 
companies are subject to the limits of  tolerance of  the-
se markets, if  not for a moral or legal responsibility, by 
private and marketing requirements. Therefore, without 
meeting certain standards, companies can be denied ac-
cess to markets and face reputational risks, what can 
represent effective losses3.
Globalization has transformed the international con-
text in several ways, but mainly by increasing the role of  
companies and private entities. This type of  company 
can in the national and global economy be more impor-
tant than many States 4. In this way, its actions directly 
affect the lives of  thousands of  people, thus regarding 
the effectiveness or not of  human rights and sustaina-
ble development goals 5. In the same way, if  commer-
cial activity can be used to generate wealth, create jobs 
and distribute income, it can, on the contrary, pressure 
that in search of  the highest income, the expenses with 
salaries are the smallest possible and the standards of  
guarantees are curtailed, thus compromising the main-
tenance of  the dignity of  the worker.
As is to be expected in the face of  the greater econo-
mic power of  companies, many national governments 
no longer exercise their capacity to demand from com-
panies acting in their markets that they comply with so-
cial and environmental standards. Still, as trade is done 
in the global market, regulations of  other countries 
may require certain conformities and private initiatives 
such as private certifications may create non-mandatory 
requirements. This non-binding characteristic is only 
in principle because if  the criteria are not met, they 
can hinder the access of  the products and services to 
3 ROBERTS, Peter W.; DOWLING, Grahame R. Corporate repu-
tation and sustained superior financial performance. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal, v.23, n.12, p.1077–1093, 2002.
4 DENNY, Danielle Mendes Thame; GRANZIERA, Maria Lui-
za Machado; RUDIGER, Dorothee Susanne. Direitos humanos e 
acesso a mercados. Revista de Direito Econômico e Socioambiental, v.8, 
n.3, p.377–409, 2018.
5 UNITED NATIONS. Agenda 2030. 2015. Disponível em: 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/
RES/70/1&Lang=E>.
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the more consolidated markets or block a significant 
amount of  price differential that would be possible 
(charging more from superior quality those that shows 
compliance with standards).
The intricate point to engage business with human 
rights and social environmental sustainability is to quan-
tify the costs and benefits, in other words risk assess-
ment and mitigation. However, there are methodolo-
gical inconsistencies in this questioning because it is a 
trans disciplinary and complex issue, which demands a 
normative, non-empirical approach because the causal 
link is often unclear between an action and its positi-
ve or negative impact on the reputation and value of  
a company for example. In addition, there is a moral 
option that requires, intrinsically, a certain level of  long-
-term ethical commitment of  the company to maintain 
the business model ahead. 
Consequently, legal studies have lot to gain from ex-
panding the scope of  human rights analyses to a more 
business oriented direction taking into consideration its 
practical ways to manage the interdependence and to 
deal with the diversity of  regulation therefore recogni-
zing that international organizations and civil society 
have an important role to play in the governance of  this 
system. This paper is not arguing that it should start to 
serve this purpose; rather that it already does so. Legal 
scholars only need to start systematically to recognize 
this fact and build upon it to better articulate the over-
lap between human rights claims and corporate claims. 
Indeed, this is the approach taken by many nations 
around the world through a more explicit incorporation 
of  the language of  primary rights into business and of  
business governance practices into laws and regulation.
2. globAl vAlue chAIn 
The period of  globalization in the 1800s benefited 
from steam power and international peace to put in pla-
ce a profitable and effective way of  transporting goods 
across borders. Some nations were in the position of  
taking advantage of  this process and established their 
global dominance. This was the era designated “Great 
Divergence”6 when countries would gain from explo-
6 BALDWIN, Richard. The great convergence: information technol-
ogy and the new globalization. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap 
Press; Harvard University Press, 2016. p. 12.
ring their differences as competitive advantages. The 
new globalization though is driven by information te-
chnology, which made possible the cheap and accurate 
movement of  ideas across borders.
This enabled the labor-intensive work to move 
abroad where human resources are cheaper and so-
cial environmental regulation weaker. Business became 
structured in global value chains – GVCs 7 and propel-
led by a rapid industrialization process of  a handful of  
developing nations. This is what can be denominated 
the “Great Convergence” 8. This economic interdepen-
dence, with fast-paced technological changes and com-
mon social environmental challenges make the world 
more unpredictable, and hard to control but at the same 
time has auspicious effects, including to developing 
countries. 
GVCs offer tremendous economic potential. 
GVCs are especially key for developing countries 
since GVCs enable the use of  intermediate 
products from abroad and take over the part of  
the production process that suits it best without 
having to build an entire industry. Integration in 
international production networks is thus regarded 
a promising growth strategy. [...] In 2010, more than 
25% of  global gross exports were double-counted. 
In a world of  GVCs, gross exports are therefore no 
longer sufficient for studying trade patterns as they 
mask the underlying structure and overstate export 
performance 9.
Rich and developing countries alike face unprece-
dented policy challenges. The traditional international 
menace of  declared war between nations became unli-
kely to most countries apart from some few exceptions 
10. Most places, however, struggle with more urgent 
threats coming from disruptive non-state forces, such 
as terrorist attacks. And are also constantly defied by 
problems associated with diffuse, long term and resis-
7 UN FORUM ON SUSTAINABILITY STANDARDS. Policy 
brief: fostering the sustainability of  Global Value Chains (GVCs). 
p. 4. Disponível em: <https://unfss.org/2017/04/11/fostering-
the-sustainability-of-global-value-chains-gvcs/>. Acesso em: 
11jun.2017.
8 BALDWIN, Richard. The great convergence: information technol-
ogy and the new globalization. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap 
Press; Harvard University Press, 2016. p. 12.
9 UN FORUM ON SUSTAINABILITY STANDARDS. Policy 
brief: fostering the sustainability of  Global Value Chains (GVCs). 
p. 4. Disponível em: <https://unfss.org/2017/04/11/fostering-
the-sustainability-of-global-value-chains-gvcs/>. Acesso em: 
11jun.2017.
10 HITCHCOCK, William I.; LEFFLER, Melvyn P.; LEGRO, 
Jeffrey W. (Org.). Shaper nations: strategies for a changing world. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016.
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tant causes, like human rights abuses. “Clashes between 
multinational enterprises and nation-states might be 
growing in frequency and intensity, evoking responses 
from both the public and the private sectors”11. 
Consumer boycotts, reputational losses and respon-
sibility for noncompliance with expected conduct are 
not the only risks to be assessed. In terms of  compe-
tition, more and more companies among themselves 
demand fair play. Therefore, “high performance with 
high integrity” 12 must become the foundational goals 
of  global business. In this context, the traditional in-
ternational level in which relations between sovereign 
states normally take place have been complemented by 
other levels of  governance, such as transnational and 
supranational. 
In this new context, states share power with other 
institutions such as corporations, local governments, 
civil society organizations, and individuals. The sharp 
distinction by source of  law is overcome by the efficien-
cy of  rulings coming from different origins. Some laws 
are made a single nation’s legislature and can regulate 
the actions internationally strongly and coercively than 
some treaties that are the traditional international law 
and represent the agreement among a plurality of  go-
vernments. For a plurality of  reasons, the demarcation 
between national law and international law is increasin-
gly flimsy. 
Formal international law is stagnating in terms 
both of  quantity and quality. It is increasingly 
superseded by ‘informal international lawmaking’13 
involving new actors, new processes, and new 
outputs, in fields ranging from finance and health 
to Internet regulation and the environment. On 
many occasions, the traditional structures of  formal 
11 VERNON, Raymond. In the hurricane’s eye: the troubled pros-
pects of  multinational enterprises. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Har-
vard University Press, 2001.
12 BAUMANN-PAULY, Dorothée; NOLAN, Justine. Business 
and human rights: from principles to practice. Abingdon: Oxon; New 
York: Routledge, 2016. p. 88.
13 The authors here cited define informal international lawmak-
ing as: ”‘[c]ross-border cooperation between public authorities, with 
or without the participation of  private actors and/or international 
organizations, in a forum other than a traditional international or-
ganization (process informality), and/or as between actors other 
than traditional diplomatic actors (such as regulators or agencies) 
(actor informality) and/or which does not result in a formal treaty 
or other traditional source of  international law (output informal-
ity)’” PAUWELYN, Joost; WESSEL, Ramses A.; WOUTERS, Jan. 
When structures become shackles: stagnation and dynamics in in-
ternational lawmaking. European Journal of  International Law, v.25, n.3, 
p.22, 2014.
lawmaking have become shackles.14
National norms and legal relationships with pure 
national efficacy are rare, as well as the exclusive appli-
cation of  international law in a watertight manner. On 
the contrary, the interdependence of  the national scope 
with the international and the public with the private 
sector is increasing at the same time as the complexity 
of  the analysis. Procedures adopted voluntarily by pri-
vate entities may have application nationally and, po-
tentially; influence the legal order of  other states. This 
would be the case of  a transnational retailer that by 
demanding compliance to a set of  standards ends up 
impacting the whole global supply chain that has also 
to comply. 
Thus, with globalization, the cheapness of  goods 
transport and the easy information exchange in real 
time, the production model has changed. To minimi-
ze fixed operating costs, companies outsource the su-
ppliers of  products and services using temporary con-
tracts as demand is sought. In this way, large companies 
count on a vast network of  possible partners to be 
activated to produce, transport, distribute, and market 
their products and services. With this, a network is for-
med that links individuals to small and large companies, 
surpassing national and foreign governments. Then the 
company that best manages global production logistics 
wins the most.
In this condition, international trade by itself  can be 
a strong engine to promote inclusive economic growth, 
poverty reduction, elevation of  labor standards, and a 
reasonable and sustainable use of  natural resources. The 
World Trade Organization normally focus on the libera-
lization of  international trade, but the main challenge at 
present time is not protectionism any more, but the “re-
surgent ethos of  liberal capitalism” 15, that can be more 
unrestrained, and disguise wrongdoers behind national 
and subnational norms. The main problem is to handle 
‘social and environmental dumping’16 that has been put 
14 PAUWELYN, Joost; WESSEL, Ramses A.; WOUTERS, Jan. 
When structures become shackles: stagnation and dynamics in in-
ternational lawmaking. European Journal of  International Law, v.25, n.3, 
p.1, 2014.
15 RUGGIE, John G. The social construction of  the UN Guiding Prin-
ciples on Business and Human Rights: corporate responsibility initiative 
working paper No. 67. Cambridge: John F. Kennedy School of  Gov-
ernment; Harvard University, 2017. p. 3.
16 ANDERSON, Kym. Contributions of  the GATT/WTO to 
global economic welfare: empirical evidence. Journal of  Economic Sur-
veys, v.30, n.1, p.56–92, 2016.
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in place along the global chain production. Companies 
and countries take advantage of  places where labor for-
ce and the natural resources can be exploited recklessly 
to produce cheaper products and services, and because 
of  that, experiment better revenues that their competi-
tors that comply with higher social and environmental 
standards. 
3. tRAde bARRIeRs And geneRAl exceptIons
Differently from the past when barrier to free trade 
were basically only Tax Law, applicable on the borders, 
now they can originate from internal national rules, 
such as the national labor and environmental laws of  
a country.  In the case study that will be analyzed in 
this paper, it is a trade barriers originated in national 
rule that determines barriers that kick in at the border, 
if  the product to be imported does not meet certain 
standards, it’s barred from entering the territory of  the 
USA. Some of  these non-tax barriers are regulated in 
the multilateral system of  international trade by the 
treaties Technical Barriers to Trade -TBT and Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures - SPS.
With the surge of  preferential agreements, new 
rules were introduced in the international trade 
system: investment, competition, environment and 
labor. There was a shift from the proliferation of  
tariff  measures, which are already under control in 
the multilateral trade system, to regulatory measures, 
which must deserved careful consideration since 
they might represent another attempt of  protection 
to the developed world and can have, overall, a 
deep disruptive effect on trade policies. The best 
example of  this regulatory barriers is presented by 
the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Agreements which aim at ruling, 
on a multilateral level, over measures that are 
created to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health, or the environment, but have become the 
21st century model of  new protectionist measures 
– the new regulatory barriers to trade. 17
Labor rules can be a case of  this kind of  renewed 
protection to the develop world and can have this dis-
ruptive effect on trade policies. To clear these differen-
ces it is important to promote a better understanding of  
the real logic behind WTO technical barriers and sani-
17 VIEIRA, Andreia Costa; THORSTENSEN, Vera Helena. 
Regulatory barriers to trade: TBT, SPS and sustainability standards. São 
Paulo: VT, 2016. p. 8. Disponível em: <http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.
br/dspace/handle/10438/17663>. Acesso em: 11jun.2017.
tary and phytosanitary barriers: what is discrimination 
and what is the real need of  protection. Both treaties 
(TBT and SPS) encourage members states to recognize 
each other’s public procedures for assessing whether a 
product conforms to their internal regulation or not. 
Both agreements give the countries the right to take 
measures when necessary for the protection of  human, 
animal or plant life or health, or the environment, but 
conditioned to appropriate levels, and if  applied in a 
manner that do not constitute means of  arbitrary or un-
justifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, do not disguising restriction to 
free international trade. 
The TBT Agreement covers regulatory barriers to 
trade, of  three types technical regulations, standards 
and conformity assessment procedures. The technical 
regulations are mandatory product characteristics, pro-
cesses, or production methods that require compliance 
otherwise state administrative sanctions are applicable. 
The standards are voluntary rules, guidelines or charac-
teristics for products, processes, and production me-
thods defined by a recognized body, each member state 
nominates their focal points that can be private entities 
that provides. The last type the conformity assessment 
procedures are procedures used, directly or indirectly, to 
determine that relevant requirements in technical regu-
lations or standards are fulfilled 18. They can be testing, 
verification, inspection and certification, which confirm 
that products fulfill the requirements laid down in regu-
lations and standards, they have to be fair and equitable. 
Either technical regulations or standards may be 
about terminology, symbols, packaging, marketing, or 
labeling and both types apply to product, process and 
production method. The difference between a stan-
dard and a technical regulation lies in compliance; while 
conformity with standards is voluntary, technical regu-
lations are mandatory19. But member states according 
to the Code of  Good Practice (Annex 3) should ensu-
re that their central government standardizing bodies 
adopt the standards. TBT requires governments to 
“take such reasonable measures as may be available to 
18 WTO. Agreement on technical barriers to trade. Disponível em: <htt-
ps://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm>. Acesso 
em: 11set.2017.
19 VIEIRA, Andreia Costa; THORSTENSEN, Vera Helena. 
Regulatory barriers to trade: TBT, SPS and sustainability standards. São 
Paulo: VT, 2016. p. 17. Disponível em: <http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.
br/dspace/handle/10438/17663>. Acesso em: 11jun.2017.
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them to ensure that local government and non-govern-
mental standardizing bodies within their territories [...] 
accept and comply with this Code of  Good Practice” 20; 
in other words, members are responsible to ensure that 
‘non-governmental entities within their territories abide 
by disciplines laid out in the multilateral level.
On a regional and subnational level also there are 
innumerous intra borders regulations not applicable by 
the national custom authority that can add complexity 
to the multilateral trading system and the continuous 
promotion of  universal, rules-based, open, transparent, 
predictable, inclusive, non-discriminatory and equitable 
dispute of  resolution system as well as meaningful and 
ethical trade liberalization. This kind of  internal ru-
ling can be a practice applied only by a Federal State, 
or a region or a company. California for example has 
a stringent state regulation about sustainable standards 
to renewables the Low Carbon Fuel Standard 21. To be 
considered renewable energy the ethanol producer that 
want to sell there has to provide thoroughly demons-
tration that the production was made in conformity of  
what California demands.
And on the borders measures can be taken to rai-
se barriers to trade in exceptional cases. In the multi-
lateral mechanism of  international trade, imports of  
products from countries that do not comply to socio-
-environmental sustainability standards can be object to 
adjustment mechanisms at the border. This is perfectly 
justifiable by Article XX of  the GATT 22. This type of  
measure would be, for example, the imposition of  an 
import tax or even the requirement of  a certain amount 
of  certificates or permits from importers. Such border 
adjustments may be legally feasible.
Article XX: General Exceptions. 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are 
not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of  arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
20 WTO. Agreement on technical barriers to trade. Disponível em: <htt-
ps://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm>. Acesso 
em: 11set.2017.
21 CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT. California Air Resources 
Board. Low carbon fuel standard. Disponível em: <http://www.energy.
ca.gov/low_carbon_fuel_standard/>. Acesso em: 28maio2018.
22 ESTY, Daniel. Greening the GATT: trade, environment, and the 
future. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
1994.
contracting party of  measures:[...]
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life 
or health;[...]
(e) relating to the products of  prison labour; [...]
(g) relating to the conservation of  exhaustible 
natural resources if  such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption; 23
It is legally feasible, but hard to be implemented, be-
cause Article XX (b) provides for a two-step test to de-
termine whether a measure is justified under its provi-
sion. The party invoking Article XX (b) shall establish: 
(1) that the policy relating been invoked is included in 
the spectrum of  policies intended to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health; the first element of  the 
test involves the scope public health policies as well as 
environmental policies. This condition is relatively easy 
to fill. 
For example, in Thailand - cigarettes, Thailand 
sought to justify its restrictions on cigarette imports 
by saying that it aimed to protect the public from 
harmful ingredients of  imported cigarettes, and to 
reduce the consumption of  cigarettes in Thailand. 
The Panel recognized that smoking constituted a 
serious risk to human health and that measures to 
reduce cigarette consumption therefore fell within 
the scope of  the policies considered under Article 
XX (b) 24
The second element is the requirement of  “neces-
sity” this is more difficult to establish. The Panel Thai-
land - Cigarettes has established that a measure is “ne-
cessary” according to Article XX (b) only when there 
are no alternative measures compatibles with the GATT 
or less incompatible whose employment could reasona-
bly be expected to be applied, to achieve its objectives. 
In summary, the Panel considered that there 
were a number of  measures consistent with the 
General Agreement that were reasonably available 
to Thailand to control the quality and quantity 
of  cigarettes smoked and that, together, could 
achieve the health policy objectives that the Thai 
government seeks by restricting the import of  
cigarettes in a manner inconsistent with Article XI: 
1. The Panel therefore considered that Thailand’s 
practice of  allowing the sale of  domestic cigarettes 
while not allowing the importation of  foreign 
23 WTO. Agreement on technical barriers to trade. Disponível em: <htt-
ps://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm>. Acesso 
em: 11set.2017.
24 UNCTAD. General exceptions, interpretation and application of  Ar-
ticle XX: course on dispute settlement in international trade, invest-
ment and intellectual property. 2003. p. 57. Disponível em: <http://
unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add33_en.pdf>.
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cigarettes was an inconsistency with the General 
Agreement because it was not ‘necessary’ under 
Article XX (b)  25
However even if  based on the exceptions of  Art 
XX of  the GATT, there may be the risk that they may 
be understood as protectionist measures and therefo-
re challenged in a panel in the dispute settlement body 
within the World Trade Organization. Ideally, the multi-
lateral trade body itself  should carry out the metaregu-
lation activity and, thus, contribute to the establishment 
of  homogeneous and internationally accepted criteria. 
Nevertheless, the WTO has been reluctant to act on the 
socio-environmental issue that has been included in the 
agenda only via panels.
4. behInd boRdeRs meAsuRes And voluntARy 
stAndARds 
The international trade of  the XXI is different from 
the trade of  the century. XX, whose main themes were 
trade liberalization through the overthrow of  tariff  
barriers and the articulation through large international 
agreements with mandatory targets that proved difficult 
to achieve. Mega preferential agreements have replaced 
multilateral ones and the concern with barriers is not 
focused on taxation. The impediments to free trade are 
much more complex and difficult to negotiate in this 
kind of  negotiation, since they often do not even ne-
cessarily present themselves as international trade mea-
sures, they are within national legal systems, they are 
administrative measures adopted within the borders, 
Behind Borders Measures, “the wolves of  protectio-
nism disguised under new sheepskin”26. 
Many unethical, asymmetrical, business-as-usual 
measures can arise from the unequal negotiation basis 
experienced in Mega External Preferential Trade Agree-
ments, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) and the Europe Association of  Southeast Asian 
25 UNCTAD. General exceptions, interpretation and application of  Ar-
ticle XX: course on dispute settlement in international trade, invest-
ment and intellectual property. 2003. p. 57. Disponível em: <http://
unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add33_en.pdf>.
26 VIEIRA, Andreia Costa; THORSTENSEN, Vera Helena. 
Regulatory barriers to trade: TBT, SPS and sustainability standards. São 
Paulo: VT, 2016. Disponível em: <http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/
dspace/handle/10438/17663>. Acesso em: 11jun.2017.
Nations Free Trade agreement (EU-ASEAN). These 
initiatives are outside the scope of  the World Trade 
Organization, don’t follow the logic of  regional agree-
ments and can be very unbalanced. That’s why Vera 
Thorstensen considers the main scope nowadays to the 
multilateral trade negotiations is to looking forward to 
implementing coherence, convergence and cooperation 
to the trade regulatory system 27. 
Each country in the exercise of  its sovereign power 
can dispose of  its public policies in the way that it un-
derstands more convenient. Political, and economic is-
sues are increasingly demanding a more comprehensi-
ve legal environment requiring an increasingly creative 
and coordinated public private articulation to achieve 
social and environmental sustainability. Labeling in this 
context can potentially become a factor important to 
be demanded specially for certain products with high 
labor intensity or consuming large chunks of  natural 
inputs. Labels if  well managed can give governments, 
companies and consumers valuable information, espe-
cially when they are related to attributes not immediate-
ly apparent in the final product 28. 
Governments, companies and consumers can then 
draw on environmental, social, and other values in 
making purchasing decisions, and doing so put pressure 
on producers to conform to these values. In terms of  
labeling, in addition to the WTO negotiations, there is 
a growing trend that will have an impact on internatio-
nal trade and which supplements the performance of  
States that is voluntary labels and certification to com-
ply with environmental and social standards in a large 
variety of  products 29, with the increasing participation 
of  non-state actors such as International Social and En-
vironmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance.
27 HORSTENSEN, Vera; MESQUITA, Alebe. Coerência, con-
vergência e cooperação regulatória nos capítulos de barreiras técnicas ao comé-
rcio e medidas sanitárias e fitossanitárias do Acordo Transpacífico. Brasília: 
IPEA, 2016. p. 34. Disponível em: <http://www.ipea.gov.br/por-
tal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28762&cati
d=390&Itemid=406>.
28 CASTRO, Douglas. Escassez hídrica e direito internacional 
econômico: o Brasil como protagonista na tranferência de água para 
regiões áridas. Revista de Direito Internacional, v.13, n.1, p. 12, 2016. 
Disponível em: <https://www.publicacoesacademicas.uniceub.br/
rdi/article/view/3949>. Acesso em: 11jun.2018.
29 DERANI, Cristiane; DALMARCO, Arthur Rodrigues. Ecola-
belling, eficiência energética e a disciplina dos PPM’s na OMC: eco-
labels de eficiência energética e sua consistência com as provisões 
do GATT e Acordo TBT. Revista de Direito Internacional, v.13, n.2, 
p. 97, 2016. Disponível em: <https://www.publicacoesacademicas.
uniceub.br/rdi/article/view/3971>. Acesso em: 11jun.2018.
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WTO rules were created to regulate public rules, 
but a ‘new kind’ of  rule has become a regulatory 
barrier to trade – sustainability standards, which 
reflect a contemporary international relations on 
global governance – plurality of  actors, plurality 
of  institutions and plurality of  norms and rules 
governing international society and consequently 
international trade. Even though private standards 
are not legally mandatory, they might become a 
de facto mandatory rule since a majority of  large 
buyers imposes them to producers. The new words 
on rules are harmonization and equivalence30. 
Voluntary sustainability standards - VSS are those 
created by private entities, such as companies, associa-
tions and other non-governmental organizations that 
are not mandatory31, but can be backed by governments 
or accepted as proof  of  compliance to achieve a kind 
of  public waiver. Therefore even being voluntary, the 
non-compliance with them might mean exclusion from 
a specific market, or clients. They might become de fac-
to mandatory if  government accept them as a condition 
to enter the market or a majority of  large buyers de-
mand them on their global value chain.
There has been a significant increase in unregulated 
voluntary standards32 from a group of  entities, NGOs, 
and private companies. There is no legal compulsion 
for compliance, the entities involved in the setting of  
VSS have no power to compel implementation, but the 
compulsion for compliance is wielded by broad range 
of  private adopters (for example a transnational com-
pany supply chains) that see value in their suppliers im-
plementing these standards. The market power of  the 
adopters renders the de facto effectiveness, the standard 
is set by a “commercial (for example a firm) or non-
-commercial (for example an NGO or industry organi-
zation) private body and is adopted by a (usually com-
mercial) private firm or organization, and conformity is 
assessed by a private auditor and the standard is enfor-
30 VIEIRA, Andreia Costa; THORSTENSEN, Vera Helena. 
Regulatory barriers to trade: TBT, SPS and sustainability standards. São 
Paulo: VT, 2016. p. 17. Disponível em: <http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.
br/dspace/handle/10438/17663>. Acesso em: 11jun.2017.
31 AMARAL, Manuela Kirschner do. Padrões privados e outras fontes 
não tradicionais de governança no âmbito dos regimes de mudança climática e 
multilateral de comércio da OMC: conflito ou convergência? 2014. PhD, 
Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2014. Disponível em: <http://re-
positorio.unb.br/bitstream/10482/16504/1/2014_ManuelaKirsch-
nerDoAmaral.pdf>.
32 UN FORUM ON SUSTAINABILITY STANDARDS. Policy 
brief: fostering the sustainability of  Global Value Chains (GVCs). 
Disponível em: <https://unfss.org/2017/04/11/fostering-the-sus-
tainability-of-global-value-chains-gvcs/>. Acesso em: 11jun.2017.
ced by a private certification body 33. They have become 
one of  the most common contemporary trade barriers, 
but, unless governments back those standards, they do 
not fall under the TBT or the SPS agreements 34. 
Regulatory gaps, unbalanced articulations and mi-
saligned incentives risk the financial stability and com-
promise the implementation of  human rights and social 
development goals. As pointed out by Jorge Viñuales, 
more adaptive legal systems have to be put in place “law, 
when considered as a regulative instrument, becomes 
a technology that can be fine-tuned and optimized to 
reach a stated purpose” 35. Laws can have this transfor-
mative effect of  incentivize what is wanted in the future 
and discourage what it is not. The present technological 
and environmental abrupt changes call for policies of  
this kind. 
Legal changes have to take into consideration the 
power of  business and finance adequate practices to the 
emergence, experimentation and refinement of  new te-
chnologies and processes. Unfortunately these type of  
socio environmental adaptive regimes are deeply groun-
ded on sunk investments and incentives policies, free 
trade does not alone lead to sustainable actions. On the 
contrary, social environmental responsible production 
tends to cost more. This especially when the aim is to 
increase the speed of  investments and cut stages throu-
gh capacity building making those who don’t have ac-
cess to energy, water or sanitation for example gain this 
access directly with the newest and more efficient socio 
and ecofriendly technologies.
Bearing in mind that in this new scenario a third-
-party manufacturer contracted abroad as a chain link 
of  the production if  it is caught violating human rights 
and sustainable development goals this can jeopardize 
the full value of  the large contractor’s brand and in-
definitely jeopardize the economic performance of  the 
great economic agent globally. The Spanish clothing 
33 HENSON, Spencer; HUMPHREY, John. Understanding the 
complexities of  private standards in global agri-food chains as they 
impact developing countries. The Journal of  Development Studies, v.46, 
n.9, p.1628–1646, 2010.
34 VIEIRA, Andreia Costa; THORSTENSEN, Vera Helena. 
Regulatory barriers to trade: TBT, SPS and sustainability standards. São 
Paulo: VT, 2016. Disponível em: <http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/
dspace/handle/10438/17663>. Acesso em: 11jun.2017.
35 VINUALES, Jorge E. Foreign investment and the environment in in-
ternational law: the current state of  play. Rochester, NY: Social Sci-
ence Research Network, 2015. p. 63. Disponível em: <https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/abstract=2661970>. Acesso em: 12jun.2017.
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retailer Zara can be pointed out as example of  the con-
troversy. On one hand its business model depends on 
one of  the broader international logistics structure. On 
the other hand it exposes the company to third-party 
threats like the use of  child labor 36 and the unpaid ma-
nufacturing workers scandals. In this last case, shoppers 
at Zara stores found unusual tags left on garments, hid-
den in pockets left by workers from Turkish third-party 
manufacturer Bravo Tekstil, which produced clothes for 
Zara, and other big international brands like Next and 
Mango. The company went bankrupt overnight in July 
2016, and its workers were not paid37. 
With these multijurisdictional regulatory challenges, 
political and civil society pressures become forceful in 
the operation of  these companies. Then, to show cor-
porate governance and the adoption of  codes of  ethics, 
an alternative is submitting the operation to sustaina-
bility reports and standards compliance. Being part of  
voluntary commitments such as the Global Compact38 
that declare in conformity with the compact principles 
and allow verification of  their compliance with the 
commitments voluntarily determined by independent 
third parties in a transparent manner, thus enabling re-
porting, third-party monitoring and auditing.
5. new consumptIve demAnd clAuse 
American law in the Section 307 of  the Tariff  Act 
of  1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1307) prohibits the importation 
of  “merchandise mined, produced or manufactured, 
wholly or in part, in any foreign country by forced or 
indentured child labor – including forced child labor”. 
Such merchandise is subject to exclusion and/or seizu-
re, and may lead to criminal investigation of  the impor-
ters.
19 U.S. Code § 1307 - Convict-made goods; 
importation prohibited
All goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, 
produced, or manufactured wholly or in part 
36 MOULDS, Josephine. Child labour in the fashion supply chain. Dis-
ponível em: <https://labs.theguardian.com/unicef-child-labour/>. 
Acesso em: 28maio2018.
37 GIRIT, Selin. Zara shoppers find labour complaints inside clothes. 
BBC News, 2017. Disponível em: <http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-41981509>. Acesso em: 28maio2018.
38 GLOBAL COMPACT. Dez princípios do Pacto Global. 2017. Dis-
ponível em: <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mis-
sion/principles>.
in any foreign country by convict labor or/and 
forced labor or/and indentured labor under penal 
sanctions shall not be entitled to entry at any of  
the ports of  the United States, and the importation 
thereof  is hereby prohibited, and the Secretary of  
the Treasury is authorized and directed to prescribe 
such regulations as may be necessary for the 
enforcement of  this provision. “Forced labor”, as 
herein used, shall mean all work or service which 
is exacted from any person under the menace of  
any penalty for its nonperformance and for which 
the worker does not offer himself  voluntarily. 
For purposes of  this section, the term “forced 
labor or/and indentured labor” includes forced or 
indentured child labor.
The consumptive demand clause by the Trade En-
forcement and Trade Facilitation Act of  201539 repeals 
the “consumptive demand” exception in 19 U.S.C. § 
1307 which had tolerated the importation of  forced la-
bor-produced goods if  those goods were not produced 
in such quantities in America enough to meet the con-
sumptive demands of  the United States. Now the new 
legal text is clear to ban any kind of  tolerance to forced 
labor imported goods:
(Sec. 609) The “consumptive demand” exception 
to the prohibition against importing merchandise 
made by convict, forced, or indentured labor under 
penal sanctions is repealed. This “consumptive 
demand” exception covers all goods, wares, articles, 
or merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured 
by such labor which are not mined, produced, 
or manufactured in such quantities in the United 
States as to meet U.S. consumptive demands.
In praxis the Commissioner of  Customs, pursuant 
to 19 C.F.R. § 12.42, can detain the shipments of  goods 
that are subject to “withhold release order”: 
19 C.F.R.§ 12.42 Findings of  Commissioner of  
Customs.
(a) If  any port director or other principal Customs 
officer has reason to believe that any class of  
merchandise that is being, or is likely to be, 
imported into the United States is being produced, 
whether by mining, manufacture, or other means, 
in any foreign locality with the use of  convict 
labor, forced labor, or indentured labor under 
penal sanctions, including forced child labor or 
indentured child labor under penal sanctions, so 
as to come within the purview of  section 307, 
Tariff  Act of  1930, he shall communicate his belief  
to the Commissioner of  Customs. Every such 
communication shall contain or be accompanied by 
a statement of  substantially the same information 
39 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Trade enforcement and trade 
facilitation Act of  2015. Disponível em: <https://www.congress.
gov/114/plaws/publ125/PLAW-114publ125.pdf>.
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as is required in paragraph (b) of  this section, if  in 
the possession of  the port director or other officer 
or readily available to him.
Competitors, civil society, foreign bodies, other im-
porters, domestic producers, or other interested per-
sons can file complaints, electronically 40, against those 
that are not complying with the rule. 
19 C.F.R.§ 12.42
(b) Any person outside the Customs Service who 
has reason to believe that merchandise produced in 
the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) of  
this section is being, or is likely to be, imported into 
the United States and, if  the production is with the 
use of  forced labor or indentured labor under penal 
sanctions, [...] may communicate his belief  to any 
port director or the Commissioner of  Customs. [...] 
the Commissioner or his designated representative 
will consider any representations offered by foreign 
interests, importers, domestic producers, or other 
interested persons.
When information reasonably but not conclusively 
indicates that merchandise within the purview of  this 
provision is being imported from any foreign locality 
with the use of  convict labor, forced labor, or indentu-
red labor under penal sanctions, including forced child 
labor, the Commissioner of  U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection may issue withhold release orders pursuant 
to 19 C.F.R. § 12.42(e). But the ban in only to the Ame-
rican market, the cargo can always be released for ex-
portation.
(e) If  the Commissioner of  Customs finds at any 
time that information available reasonably but not 
conclusively indicates that merchandise within the 
purview of  section 307 is being, or is likely to be, 
imported, he will promptly advise all port directors 
accordingly and the port directors shall thereupon 
withhold release of  any such merchandise pending 
instructions from the Commissioner as to whether 
the merchandise may be released otherwise than for 
exportation.
If  the Commissioner is provided with information 
sufficient to make a precise determination that the goo-
ds in question are subject to the provisions of  19 U.S.C. 
§ 1307, are being imported from any foreign locality 
with the use of  convict labor, forced labor, or indentu-
40 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Customs and border protec-
tion e-Allegations portal:  official United States Government system, 
which may be used only for authorized purposes: the government 
may monitor and audit usage of  this system, and all persons are 
hereby notified that use of  this system constitutes consent to such 
monitoring and auditing. Disponível em: <https://eallegations.cbp.
gov/Home/Index2>.
red labor under penal sanctions, including forced child 
labor, the Commissioner will publish a formal finding 
to that effect in the Customs Bulletin and in the Federal 
Register pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 12.42(f).
(f) If  it is determined on the basis of  the foregoing 
that the merchandise is subject to the provisions of  
the said section 307, the Commissioner of  Customs, 
with the approval of  the Secretary of  the Treasury, 
will publish a finding to that effect in a weekly issue 
of  the Customs Bulletin and in the Federal Register.
If  in this situation importers have the opportunity 
to either re-export the detained shipments or to submit 
information demonstrating that the goods are not in 
violation of  19 U.S.C. § 1307.
(g) Any merchandise of  a class specified in a 
finding made under paragraph (f) of  this section, 
which is imported directly or indirectly from the 
locality specified in the findings and has not been 
released from Customs custody before the date of  
publication of  such finding in the Federal Register 
shall be considered and treated as an importation 
prohibited by section 307, Tariff  Act of  1930, 
unless the importer establishes by satisfactory 
evidence that the merchandise was not mined, 
produced, or manufactured in any part with the use 
of  a class of  labor specified in the finding.
Failing to do so the shipments subject to findings 
can be excluded or seized. To avoid a possible “with-
hold release order”, prudently importers better im-
plement a thoroughly due diligence over their supply 
chains to exactly understand where and how their pro-
ducts are manufactured or produced in whole or in part, 
in order to do a proper risk assessment. Because this 
due diligence costs money, the decision to implement 
it will depends, inter alia, on (i) whether suspect goods 
can always be re-exported; and on (ii) who bears any 
loss (for example, the importer can make a deal with 
his supplier that the supplier get paid only if  the good 
passes US customs, with such a deal, the importer has 
much less reason to do due diligence.
The practical affect of  the first withhold release or-
ders made in regards to forced labor in over a decade in 
America, was on Chinese companies. The actual claims 
were over imported soda ash, calcium chloride, caustic 
soda, and viscose/rayon fiber that were made by for-
ced convict labor and imported potassium, potassium 
hydroxide, potassium nitrate that was believed to be mi-
ned and manufactured using convict labor41 and stevia 
41 HAMPSEY, Meghan. CBP enforces the ban on goods produced with 
forced labor with two withhold release orders: human rights first. Disponível 
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and peeled garlic cultivated using convict labor. 
So far the measure was been used only to curtail 
the “China Syndrome” 42: rising China imports causing 
higher unemployment, lower labor force participation, 
and reduced wages in local American markets. U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents 
have not been permitted to make site inspections in 
China since 2009, and Chinese officials deny the sus-
pected forced labor, although they maintain a network 
of  prison labor facilities43.
6. envIRonmentAl, socIAl, And goveRnAnce 
Going beyond the bilateral US-China trade rela-
tionships, because of  the American law studied above, 
there is a risk that imported products from any coun-
try be excluded from the USA market because they are 
made with forced labor. This regulation may incentive 
companies to apply due diligence standards into their 
own subsidiaries and to require similar third-party certi-
fications. Because of  these characteristics, Environmen-
tal, Social, and Governance (ESG) reporting has beco-
me an increasing part of  business strategy. Defining the 
right indicators to use in the company and in a sector, 
promoting stakeholder engagement, and enhancing the 
social environmental policies have become essential to 
achieve the long-term sustainability of  the business en-
terprises, avoiding litigation costs and reputational risks 
that could eventually even compromise the finance per-
formance of  an enterprise. 
According to WWF/ISEAL, what makes a standard 
system reliable is: 1) transparency; 2) a multistakehol-
der participation process, involving “the entire supply 
chain from businesses, civil society, governments, re-
search institutions and NGOs, with balanced decision-
-making”; 3) independent verification by third party 
auditors or certification body; and 4) continuous im-
em: <https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/cbp-enforces-ban-
goods-produced-forced-labor-two-withhold-release-orders>. Aces-
so em: 28maio2018.
42 AUTOR, David H.; DORN, David; HANSON, Gordon H. 
The China syndrome: local labor market effects of  import com-
petition in the United States. American Economic Review, v.103, n.6, 
p.2121–2168, 2013.
43 BOWE, Alexander. U. S. exposure to forced labor exports from China 
developments since the U.S: trade facilitation and trade enforcement Act 
of  2015. USA, 2017. Disponível em: <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/Research/Forced%20Labor%20Report.pdf>.
provement 44. To multi-nationals, because they have to 
manage their production globally, there is a consistent 
increase in the demand for reliable standards, especially 
for accessing the impact their investments have. This is 
the conclusion the GIIN report of  2017 that also shows 
that 60% of  the investors “actively track their financial 
performance of  their investments with respect to sus-
tainable development goals or plan to do so soon”45. 
This is seriously collected information, not just pro-
paganda of  firms saying that they are concerned and are 
monitoring, when in practice they are not. This investor 
survey is based on an analysis of  the activities of  209 
of  the world’s leading impact investing organizations, 
including fund managers, foundations, banks, develo-
pment finance institutions, family offices, pension fun-
ds, and insurance companies. The surveyed represent a 
pool of  impact investing assets nearly USD 114 billion.
Impact investments are investments made into 
companies, organizations, and funds with the 
intention to generate social and environmental 
impact alongside a financial return. Impact 
investments can be made in both emerging and 
developed markets, and target a range of  returns 
from below market to market rate, depending on 
investors’ strategic goals. The growing impact 
investment market provides capital to address 
the world’s most pressing challenges in sectors 
such as sustainable agriculture, renewable energy, 
conservation, microfinance, and affordable 
and accessible basic services including housing, 
healthcare, and education.46
Social environmental sustainability standards can 
vary widely especially on the level of  performance they 
require, some are low-bar, easy to achieve, and therefore 
often used as a measure of  only appearing sustainable 
without actually committing and applying the efforts 
needed to become really more sustainable; this kind of  
disguise is called ‘greenwash’ 47. This disguise practice 
44 WWF/ISEAL. SDGs mean business: how credible standards can 
help companies deliver the 2030 agenda. New York: WWF/ISEAL, 
2017. p. 15. Disponível em: <http://www.standardsimpacts.org/
resources-reports/wwfiseal-report-sdgs-mean-business-how-credi-
ble-standards-can-help-companies>. Acesso em: 18maio2017.
45 MUDALIAR, Abhilash et al. Annual Impact Investor Survey 2017. 
Global Impact Investing Network, 2017. p. 15. Disponível em: 
<https://thegiin.org/knowledge/publication/annualsurvey2017>. 
Acesso em: 31maio2017.
46 GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK. 2017 Annual 
Impact Investor Survey the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN). UK, 
2017. Disponível em: <https://thegiin.org/assets/GIIN_Annual-
ImpactInvestorSurvey_2017_Web_Final.pdf>.
47 LYON, Thomas P.; MONTGOMERY, A. Wren. The means 
and end of  greenwash. Organization & Environment, v.28, n.2, p.223–
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can have a negative backlash on the reputation of  the 
company using this trick. Another kind of  standar-
ds is the high-bar type, which can be very demanding. 
Some focus on preventing worst corporate practices, 
others establish rigorous improvement pathways to be 
followed in order to achieve good governance. 
The effective impact a standard can have on driving 
the companies to a more sustainable path, depends a 
lot on the qualities accessed, the process of  compliance 
and the due diligence mechanisms. But also the external 
reading of  the standard is very important. Because how 
consumers and other stakeholders value that standard is 
directly related with the ability of  it providing incenti-
ves and mobilizing investments of  the actors within the 
supply chains. The improve in the performance come 
from being seeing as a better quality player, this can pro-
vide enhanced market access, better contract terms and, 
very often, a direct price premium to producers (better 
products can cost more). 
Some initiative have long worked on setting good 
examples this is the case of  OECD Guidelines and Bu-
siness and Human Rights Grievance Mechanism deals 
with labor standards, human rights, environment, bri-
bery, etc. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational En-
terprises 48 incorporates ILO core labor standards 49 and 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Ri-
ghts 50. It can provide a due diligence guidance and have 
an increasingly important role in helping businesses to 
implement these standards to global value chains. 
The grievance mechanism is globally available 
covering global value chains with a link to companies 
from any of  the 48 adherent governments. [...] 
Between 2011 and 2016, more than 50% of  
all complaints brought, accepted for further 
examination and closed resulted in agreements 
between the parties. [...] Concrete results were, for 
example, achieved regarding implementing systems 
to end forced and child labor in garment supply 
chains, improving health and safety for agricultural 
workers, enhancing human rights due diligence for 
sport mega-events, and arranging compensation for 
249, 2015.
48 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT. OECD guidelines for multinational enterpris-
es. Paris: OECD, 2011. Disponível em: <http://public.eblib.com/
choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=797696>. Acesso em: 27maio2018.
49 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE. Labour standards. 
Disponível em: <http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/lang--en/
index.htm>. Acesso em: 27maio2018.
50 HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL. Guiding principles on business and 
human rights: implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework. 2011.
indigenous people. 51 
Oriented by these guidelines, governments have 
various tools to incentivize companies to behave res-
ponsibly, notably through export credits and trade su-
pport diplomatic missions. Export credit agencies can 
withdraw support for companies in foreign markets as 
a penalty for irresponsible corporate behavior. Institu-
tional investors, such as pension funds and sovereign 
wealth funds, can also have a significant potential to use 
finance to promote better business behavior amongst 
their investee companies. And increasing quantity of  
institutional investors demands investment approaches 
that consider ESG factors.
Beyond the due diligence responsibility and the eco-
nomic long-term perspective, governing the ESG beco-
mes an practical tool to manage human rights in a broad 
sense. Sébastien Jodoin and Katherine Lofts illustrate 
how for example Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
are interdependent with Climate Change52:
Figure 1 - Social environmental measures and Human 
Rights
Source: Yale, 2013
The necessity of  measuring the environmental, so-
cial governance stimulated many initiatives to assess, 
report and manage those criteria.  The Global Initiative 
for Sustainability Reporting 53 for example aggregates 
51 NIEUWENKAMP, Roel. Crash course Nieuwenkamp Responsi-
ble Business OECD. 2018. Disponível em: <https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=ZFz2Hv4X90I&feature=youtu.be>. Acesso em: 
27maio2018.
52 ODOIN, Sébastien; LOFTS, Katherine. Economic, social, and cul-
tural rights and climate change: a legal reference guide. New Haven, CT: 
CISDL, GEM & ASAP, 2013. p. 5.
53 GRI. Global Reporting Initiative. Disponível em: <https://www.
globalreporting.org/Pages/default.aspx>. Acesso em: 27maio2018.
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many ratings that become products, targeting the in-
vestor audience. But the focus of  these products have 
been the environment and governance aspects, leaving 
behind important social aspect as points out a NYU 
Stern report:  “of  the 580 ratings products aggregated 
by the Global Initiative for Sustainability Reporting, 
97% of  environmental efforts and 80% of  governan-
ce efforts target 18 investors as the primary audience. 
When it comes to social efforts, only 14% similarly tar-
geted investors.”54
Reliably measuring the effectiveness of  the com-
pany actions and comparing the ESG performance of  
companies is still something to be improved. This re-
veals the demand for more empirical research about the 
concrete results of  specific actions adopted by the com-
panies and a further integration of  social environmen-
tal sustainability into the strategic planning process. But 
this broader approach would concretely accelerate the 
necessary change in the current production patterns. 
And private or national like the American about forced 
labor can provide incentives to the implementation of  
ESG initiatives.
7. humAn RIghts And methodology of 
Assessment 
There is an intrinsic tension between moral ambi-
tions as they were presented in the language of  human 
rights declaration and treaties and how it is presented in 
the language of  compliance reports and development 
goals. The traditional human rights discourse suggests 
that deprivations must be ended right away with top-
-priority remedial attention, while the metrics of  reports 
and goals invite an incremental approach to overcoming 
deprivations. Because there is a certain follow up list 
or a set of  measures to take, toward the objective the 
approach to it is step-by-step. 
The development goals discourse invites a 
diachronic, incremental approach: we gradually 
reduce severe deprivations over several decades. 
The human rights discourse, by contrast, brooks no 
such delay. Once we recognize a human right not 
54 LABOWITZ, Sarah; O’CONNOR, Casey. Putting the “S” 
in ESG: measuring human rights performance for investors. 
New York: NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, 
2017. p. 8. Disponível em: <https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/547df270e4b0ba184dfc490e/t/58cad912e58c6274180b5
8b6/1489688854754/Metrics-Report-final-1.pdf>.
to be enslaved, we must not make a 25-year plan 
aiming to halve the number of  slaves or aiming 
to reduce floggings by half. Once we recognize a 
human right not to be exterminated, we must not 
make a 25-year plan to halve the killing rate at Nazi 
concentration camps. Once we recognize a human 
right not to be subjected to economic institutions 
under which hundreds of  millions foreseeably and 
avoidably cannot meet their basic needs, we must 
not make a 25-year plan to reduce these severe 
deprivations by 27% but must initiate the necessary 
institutional reforms right away. 55
Putting this way it is clear that is a problem of  moral 
evaluation notwithstanding the efforts of  the official in-
cremental discourse to decline to tackle this issue expli-
citly this way. By contrast implicitly the current analyses 
often require assuming that it is “conceivable to separa-
te the description of  social events and their moral and 
political evaluation”56, although it is impossible to reach 
value-neutral descriptions in legal analyses and quasi-
-natural characteristics in a society. Performing this type 
of  culture-based assessment represents a major hurdle 
to the effective implementation of  human rights and 
sustainable development goals. It can conceal that the 
widespread practice of  creating numerical indexes and 
rankings to assess legal performance serve to qualify, 
and rank, making it easier to simplify the comparison of  
often complexly unequal realities.
Another challenge of  the use of  incremental me-
trics is that the division of  responsibilities can be done 
unfairly, saddling the weakest links at the supply chain, 
forcing the least capable companies and countries with 
the largest responsibilities and costs, eventually even ex-
pelling poor players from the market. There is no doubt 
that companies of  any size using forced labor must be 
expelled from market. But stringent compliance rules 
can raise the cost of  production, creating a minimal 
investment threshold. So ethical small companies may 
face the situation that they cannot compete with weal-
thier ones and loose their foreign customers because 
they do not have the means to document that theirs 
production is free of  forced labor.  
In other words the conformity cost of  a private 
55 POGGE, Thomas; SENGUPTA, Mitu. Assessing the sustain-
able development goals from a human rights perspective. Journal of  
International and Comparative Social Policy, v.32, n.2, p.83–97, 2016.
56 NASSER, Salem Hikmat; GHIRARDI, José Garcez. Around 
the pyramid: political-theoretical challenges to law in the age of  
global governance. Revista de Direito Internacional, v.15, n.1, 2018. 
Disponível em: <https://www.publicacoes.uniceub.br/rdi/article/
view/4934>. Acesso em: 28maio2018.
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standard for example can push the less wealthy com-
panies out of  a market if  major clients or governments 
require these standards where the company intends 
to export to. And the imposition of  no-forced-labor 
standards will raise the price of  the product supplied, 
some companies will pick up the business of  supplying 
the relevant product, and these companies will employ 
workers that are better treated than the forced laborers 
were treated before, creating then a virtuous cycle of  
curbing social and environmental dumping. 
This type of  unfair commercial practice is charac-
terized by the advantages of  lower price competitors 
acquire by illicitly lowering wages, reducing employees’ 
benefits and avoiding sustainable practices. But deci-
ding if  a practice is this kind of  dumping can be chal-
lenging. Like the 1990’s discussion about inclusion of  
the social clause in the international trade regulation, it 
can reflect a “hypocritical drive to legislate a particular 
morality” 57once the fight against low wages can disgui-
se protectionism measures. Under the flag of  protecting 
low wages workers interests, rich countries can block 
the access to their market to companies from develo-
ping countries.
Undoubtful the social environmental dumping is 
a problem, especially because he international capital 
flows tent to take advantages of  convenient or unregu-
lated countries. But not every export from country that 
has lower standards for labor rights and environmental 
protection gain an unfair advantage. And the asymme-
tries of  the level of  protection worldwide do not intrin-
sically force all countries to lower their standards in a 
“race to the bottom” 58 otherwise countries should be 
prevented to invest abroad and only trade with those 
that have similar labor and environmental standards.
But in this sense until what point national govern-
ments and transnational private policies can take measu-
res to put pressure on other countries and companies to 
comply with their internal standards? On the one hand, 
there is the need to improve workplace conditions and 
the international legal coherence. On the other hand, it 
is the risk of  protectionism that industrial nations pres-
57 LAL, Deepak. Social standards and social dumping. In: 
Merits and limits of  markets. Berlin: Springer; Heidelberg, 1998. 
p.255–274. Disponível em: <https://link.springer.com/chap-
ter/10.1007/978-3-642-72210-3_11>. Acesso em: 28maio2018.
58 WTO. Understanding the WTO labour standards: highly contro-
versial. Disponível em: <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/bey5_e.htm>. Acesso em: 28maio2018.
sure to raise standards to undermine the comparative 
advantage of  lower wage trading partners, curtailing 
their economic development possibilities by hampering 
their ability to trade with mature markets. And at an 
extreme, some demanded standards could be too high 
for countries and companies to meet at their low level 
of  development. 
This inclusively is one example of  difficulty of  using 
one size fits all moral choice. The universal zero tar-
get approach for all economic and social human rights 
obligations is hard to work with also because of  these 
controversies. Its not about defending that certain bu-
sinesses employing forced labor should be allowed to 
continue to do so, but about recognizing a dialectic po-
litical decision behind the definition of  what is forced 
labor.
Historically unfairly excessive expectations had been 
imposed upon the poorest. The international legal fra-
mework reflect that by avoiding the traditional idealist 
approach, and turning to the principle of  common but 
differentiated responsibilities, which states that human 
rights and sustainable development goals should be 
made relevant to all countries, but that the roles and 
responsibilities in the implementation of  them should 
be differentiated according to the different national rea-
lities, capacities and levels of  development of  different 
countries and also according to national policies and 
priorities. This in the climate accord59 for example led 
to the inclusion of  nationally determinable targets. 
Global enterprises, given their wealth and influence, 
ought to be taking the lead in providing the needed re-
sources for adaptation of  their global supply chain, for 
example, by improving the management and the data 
collection in their subsidiaries. National government 
can encourage this international capacity building besi-
des economic growth mechanisms and charitable acti-
vities. Legal initiatives like the end of  the consumptive 
demand clause by the Trade Enforcement and Trade 
Facilitation Act of  2015 can in a way instill these results. 
If  the world’s most influential agents had been 
held sufficiently accountable for what they owe toward 
making sustainable development work, the concepts of  
partnership and universalism would have been more 
meaningful, rather than what they are now likely to be-
59 UNITED NATIONS. Acordo de Paris. 2015. Disponível 
em: <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/No%20
Volume/54113/A-54113-China-080000028047bf86.pdf>.
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come: a smokescreen for extreme global inequalities. 60
The international assistance discourse is heavily 
focused on global economic growth and in charitable 
inflows. But it can represent business opportunities. 
Growth itself  has limits, causes environmental negative 
externalities and poses threats to the realization of  hu-
man rights. But an articulated international legal system 
can quantify the negative impacts and force them into 
the production price. In this context private sector is 
part of  the solution by gaining profits with the green 
economy
[...]green economy is the economy that results in 
improved human well-being and social equity, while 
significantly reducing environmental risks and 
ecological scarcity. [...] The development path must 
maintain, enhance and, where possible, rebuild 
natural capital as a critical economic good and as 
a source of  public benefits, especially for the needy 
population [...] In a green economy, income and 
employment growth must be driven by public and 
private investments that reduce carbon emissions 
and pollution and increase energy and resource use, 
and prevent losses of  biodiversity and ecosystem 
services. These investments need to be generated 
and supported by specific public spending, policy 
reforms and regulatory changes. The development 
path must maintain, enhance and, where possible, 
rebuild natural capital as a critical economic good 
and as a source of  public benefits, especially for 
the needy population whose livelihood and security 
depend on nature. 61
The greatest legal challenge, therefore, is to identify 
these ideological synergetic contents in search of  com-
plementarity, to promote: economic development with 
social and environmental responsibility. In addition to 
being low-carbon this new economic paradigm needs to 
take into account planetary boundaries and the principle 
of  equity. In practice, this corresponds to maintaining a 
significant level of  growth for poor countries, interme-
diate level of  growth for emerging countries and close 
to zero level of  growth for developed societies. Over-
coming the deficits through a decrease in the inequality 
is the key point then. 
8. conclusIon
60 POGGE, Thomas; SENGUPTA, Mitu. Assessing the sustain-
able development goals from a human rights perspective. Journal of  
International and Comparative Social Policy, v.32, n.2, p.83–97, 2016.
61 UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME. 
Towards a green economy: pathways to sustainable development and 
poverty eradication. Nairobi: UNEP, 2011. p. 2.
Responsible business conduct is no longer voluntary 
in the sense of  being optional, even though it is still not 
legally binding. There is an increased uptake of  corpo-
rate responsibility and due diligence standards in legal 
instruments like the example studied here. In fact, legal 
or commercial consequences increasingly become ap-
plicable to the non-observance of  due diligence measu-
res. On this path, greater coherence is needed regarding 
international and national policies, especially by offering 
businesses incentives to comply with ESG and by at-
taching greater consequences to irresponsible business 
behavior. 
Governments have a variety of  different tools at 
their disposal to promote responsible business and to 
lead by example through economic diplomacy instru-
ments, public procurement, state-owned enterprises, 
and trade and investment policies. Solution oriented le-
gal studies have to coordinate these diverse options in 
their interdependent dimensions. Scholars and practitio-
ners focusing only on the static dimension of  principles 
of  human rights and sustainable development goals are 
insufficiently exploring their capacity to change, when 
their work should promote the dialogue across divides 
in the business and human rights field in order to be 
able to push the creation of  new norms, and practi-
ces complying with standards and improving corporate 
compliance.
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